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INTRODUCTION
“[I]ntellectual property laws and the antitrust laws share [a] common
1
purpose[] of promoting innovation and enhancing consumer welfare.”
Patent laws grant exclusive rights to inventors in exchange for the
2
disclosure of their creations into mainstream society. On the other
hand, antitrust laws allow for reasonable consumer access to such
discoveries by preventing inventors from unfairly exploiting their
3
creations. Although patent and antitrust laws promote similar goals,
they do so in contention with each other. “Because a patent is a special
grant of power to exclude competition, and exclusionary power has
historically been scrutinized strictly under the antitrust laws, the patent
and antitrust laws have historically coexisted in tension with one
4
another.” “[T]here is tension between the patent and the antitrust laws
that flows naturally from the need for courts and the antitrust
enforcement agencies to determine the circumstances in which the
principles underlying one body of law will prevail over those of the
5
other.”
The balancing act described above is exactly what occurs at the
International Trade Commission (ITC) when it reviews § 337 claims.
The ITC has two functions under § 337: (1) to protect domestic industry
6
and (2) to enforce domestic patents. Respondents subject to § 337
claims likely will assert that the patent is invalid, turning to patent law,
7
or that the patent is misused, relying on antitrust to justify its behavior.
In some cases where the latter is asserted, the ITC is forced to make a
choice between protecting domestic industry and enforcing a domestic
patent. The assertion of a patent misuse defense also presents
interesting issues on appeal, especially those decisions appealed to the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The Federal Circuit’s
jurisdiction and expertise is based in patent law, which leads to the
1. 4 VON KALINOWSKI ET AL., ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION §
72.02[4] (Matthew Bender 2d ed. 2010) (quoting 1995 Intellectual Property Guidelines § 1).
See also SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1203 (2d Cir. 1981).
2. SCM v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1203 (2d Cir. 1981).
3. See id.
4.
SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, AM. BAR ASSOC., THE ANTITRUST
COUNTERATTACK IN PATENT INFRINGEMENT LITIGATION 47 (1994).
5. VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 1.
6. See Sapna Kumar, The Other Patent Agency: Congressional Regulation of the ITC,
61 FLA. L. REV. 529, 547–48 (2009).
7. See e.g., C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (In a
non-§ 337 context, alleged infringer argued that patent was invalid, or that antitrust justified
infringing actions).
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question of how antitrust issues are handled within our highest patent
court.
This Comment, then, addresses the tensions faced by the Federal
Circuit in reviewing the ITC’s patent misuse decisions that address § 337
claims. Patent misuse is the only antitrust-related doctrine that the
Federal Circuit court has addressed in a § 337 appeal. There are two
types of patent misuse: per se misuse and the rule of reason misuse.
First, this Comment provides relevant background information by
explaining § 337 itself, the administrative power and function of the ITC
under § 337, and the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction and deferential stance
to the ITC regarding § 337 appeals. Subsequently, this Comment
examines both per se and rule of reason patent misuse defenses, within
the context of ITC appeals to the Federal Circuit of § 337 claims, by
laying out their doctrinal frameworks as set out by the Federal Circuit in
8
U.S. Phillips Corp. v. ITC. With the preface that patent misuse
jurisprudence is rather limited within the spectrum of ITC cases
appealed to the Federal Circuit under § 337, this Comment analyzes the
Federal Circuit’s treatment of patent misuse defenses by considering the
court’s holdings in U.S. Phillips Corp. This analysis finds that while the
Federal Circuit’s result in Phillips was well reasoned, the test set out for
patent misuse under the rule of reason is problematic under the § 337
framework. The rule of reason test balances procompetitive benefits
against anticompetitive effects, focusing solely on antitrust; § 337 is a
patent-antitrust statute and defenses asserted under it should be
evaluated by both patent and antitrust policy. This problem does not
arise within the per se patent misuse doctrine. There, Congress has
already considered the patent and antitrust justifications and decided
what specific circumstances the doctrine encapsulates. Accordingly, this
Comment proposes that patent misuse analysis, under the rule of reason
doctrine and in the context of § 337 appeals, should involve a mixed test
that will balance patent and antitrust policy, in order to keep both
considerations in sight.
I. SECTION 337, THE ITC, AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
This part of the Comment will discuss § 337 by examining (1) the
statute, the capacity, and function of its governing agency; (2) the ITC
under § 337; and (3) the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit to hear
appeals regarding § 337 matters from ITC final decisions.

8.

424 F.3d 1179 (Fed. Cir. 2005).

SHELBOURNE - FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE)

488

MARQUETTE I.P. LAW REVIEW

6/20/2011 1:12 PM

[Vol. 15:2

A. What is Section 337?
Section 337 of the Tariff act of 1930, as amended, is the authorizing
statute of the ITC. It gives the agency the power “to conduct
9
investigations into allegations of unfair practices in import trade” that
adversely affect the U.S. economy. The statute makes unlawful
“[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair acts in the importation of
articles . . . into the United States, or in the sale of such articles by the
owner, importer or consignee, the threat or effect of which is (i) to
10
destroy or substantially injure an industry in the United States . . . .”
Section 337 also deems that it is illegal to import into “the United
States, the sale for importation, or the sale within the United States
after importation by the owner, importer, or consignee, of articles that
11
(i) infringe a valid and enforceable United States patent . . . .” To
bring a patent infringement complaint before the ITC under § 337,
“there [must] be importation of infringing articles. . . . [and] the
complainant [must] demonstrate that a domestic industry in articles
practicing a claim of the patent in suit ‘exists or is in the process of being
12
established.’” Although this Comment focuses on patent litigation, §
337 also protects other intellectual property rights such as copyrights
13
and trademarks.
B. Section 337: The International Trade Commission and Patent
Litigation
Section 337 provides two initial requirements for patent complaints:
(1) the establishment of domestic industry and (2) jurisdiction. As
mentioned above, the domestic industry element is satisfied by showing
that a domestic industry exists or is in the process of being established,
14
which is related to the articles protected by the patent. The domestic
industry requirement is then furthered divided into two prongs, one
where the ITC reviews technical considerations and another where they
15
consider economic considerations.
A complainant satisfies the
technical prong by showing that “it or its licensees or ‘practices at least
9. G. Brian Busey, An Introduction to Section 337 and the U.S. International Trade
Commission, in PATENT LITIGATION 2008 3 (PLI 2008).
10. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(A) (1988) (amended 2009).
11. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B)(i).
12. Busey, supra note 9, at 7 (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(2)).
13. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1337(a)(1)(B)(i), (a)(1)(C) (1988) (amended 2009).
14. Supra Part I.A. See also 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(A)(i)–(iii).
15. Kumar, supra note 6, at 534 (citing In re Male Prophylactic Devices, USITC Inv.
No. 337-TA-546, 2007 ITC LEXIS 860, at *60 (Aug. 1, 2007)).
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16

one claim of the asserted patents[.]’” The economic prong is satisfied
by a showing of “domestic activities, with respect to the patent or
patented article, that involve: (A) significant investment in plant and
equipment; (B) significant employment of labor or capital; or (C)
substantial investment in [its] exploitation, including engineering,
17
research and development, or licensing.” Whether the prongs are met
18
is a subjective determination by the ITC; however, these initial
19
requirements are usually easy to meet.
The jurisdiction element of the initial requirements is generally also
easily met. In a potential proceeding, the ITC will exercise in rem
20
jurisdiction over the allegedly infringing product. Accordingly, the
ITC does not need personal jurisdiction over the manufacturers or
importers of the product, which provides an easy way to gain
21
jurisdiction in matters that involve foreign defendants. Despite the
way in which jurisdiction attaches, the manufacturers or importers are
not foreclosed from participating in the proceedings. These parties are
“given [the] opportunity to participate in the proceeding . . . [and] may
22
raise any equitable or legal defense, such as patent invalidity.”
Once the initial requirements are deemed satisfied within a
complaint, “the ITC [] decide[s] if action is merited. If [the ITC]
23
chooses to proceed, it will open an investigation.”
After the
investigation is opened, it will be assigned to one of six ALJs
[Administrative Law Judges], that ALJ will then conduct an evidentiary
24
hearing.
Also at this point, “the ITC’s office of Unfair Import
Investigations assigns a staff attorney to represent the public interest [in
the case], and the attorney will serve as an [active] party in the
investigation. . . . The attorney . . . can influence the outcome of the

16. Id. (alterations in original).
17. See id. (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(3) (1988) (amended (2006)).
18. See id. at 535.
19. See generally id.
20. Kumar, supra note 6 at 535.
21. See id. at 535.
22. See id. (citing Walter J. Blenko, When Does Patent Infringement Become Unfair
Competition?,
JOM,
Oct.
1990,
at
55,
available
at
http://www.tms.org/pubs/journals/JOM/matters/matters-9010.html and 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c)
(2006)).
23. See id. at 536; 19 C.F.R. § 210.58 (2008). (This stipulates a 35-day waiting period
during where the ITC reviews the complaint for sufficiency. The waiting period may be
extended by the agency or at the request of a party).
24. Kumar, supra note 6, at 536 (citing U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, SECTION 337
INVESTIGATIONS: ANSWERS TO FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 2 (2004)).
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25

case.” A short discovery period will follow, and “[t]ypically after six or
26
seven months, the ALJ will hold a formal evidentiary hearing[.]” The
evidentiary hearing will result in an Initial Determination, “which is
27
certified to the ITC with the evidentiary record.” “The decision then
automatically goes up to the ITC’s six-member Commission, who have
the option to decline review . . . (allowing it to become final), review and
28
adopt it, modify it, or reverse it.” “The Commission’s order [will go]
into effect after sixty days, except [for] the rare event that the President
29
disapproves of [the order] on policy grounds under § 3379(j).” This
entire proceeding will move rather quickly; most § 337 investigations are
30
completed within fifteen months.
Prevailing complainants in § 337 litigation generally receive some
31
32
form of exclusion order. Exclusion orders may be limited or general.
“Limited exclusion orders instruct the U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (Customs) [agency] to exclude from entry all articles that are
covered by the patent at issue and that originate from a named
33
respondent in the investigation.” General exclusion orders, in contrast
direct Customs “to exclude all infringing articles, without regard to
34
source.” An additional penalty the ITC may grant is an exclusion
35
order covering downstream products. Downstream products are those
25. See id. (citing Russell E. Levine, The Benefits of Using the ITC, MANAGING
INTELL. PROP. 25, 27 (Sept. 2004)).
26. Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 556(b)(3) (2006)).
27. Id. (citing U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, SECTION 337 INVESTIGATIONS: ANSWERS
TO FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 2 (2004)).
28. Id. at 537 (citing U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, SECTION 337 INVESTIGATIONS:
ANSWERS TO FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 21 (2004), available at
http://www.usitc.gov/trade_remedy/int_prop/pub3708.pdf).
29. Kumar, supra note 6, at 537 (citing Press Release, Broadcom Corp., Broadcom
Urges Administration Orders to Let ITC Patent Action Stand (July 5, 2007), available at
http://www.broadcom.com/press/release.php?id=1023034).
30. See Busey, supra note 9, at 15 (citing a target completion date of 15 months). See
also Kumar supra note 6, at 537 ((citing U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, PERFORMANCE AND
ACCOUNTABILITY
REPORT:
FISCAL
YEAR
2007
70,
available
at
http://www.usitc.gov/ext_relations/about_itc/USITC_PAR_2007.pdf
(citing
17-month
completion dates).
31. See Kumar, supra note 6, at 537 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(1) (2006)).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 537–38 (citing U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, SECTION 337 INVESTIGATIONS:
ANSWERS TO FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 22 (2004), available at
http://www.usitc.gov/trade_remedy/int_prop/pub3708.pdf)).
34. Id. at 538 (citing U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, SECTION 337 INVESTIGATIONS:
ANSWERS TO FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 22 (2004), available at
http://www.usitc.gov/trade_remedy/int_prop/pub3708.pdf.
35. See Busey, supra note 9, at 22.
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that contain the infringing product as a component. The ITC applies a
balancing test to determine whether the inclusion of a downstream
product is proper; this test “weighs the complainant’s interest in
obtaining complete relief against the possible disruption of legitimate
trade of products that were not themselves found to violate
37
Section 337.” The ITC must consider the policy implications of an
exclusion order before it issues one.
The ITC can decline to issue an exclusion order, or
can narrow it, if after considering the effect of such
exclusion order, or can narrow it, if “after considering
the effect of such exclusion upon the public health and
welfare, competitive conditions in the United States
economy, the production of like or directly competitive
articles in the United States, and United States
consumers, [the ITC] finds that such articles should not
be excluded from entry” or such an order should not be
38
issued.
Lastly, the ITC also has the option of “issu[ing] a cease-and-desist
39
order in addition to or in place of an exclusion order.” These orders
prevent those found violating the statute from engaging in unfair
40
methods, or acts, namely “selling ‘commercially significant’ domestic
41
inventories of infringing goods.”
C. Section 337 Appeals and the Federal Circuit
Pursuant to § 337(c), “Any person adversely affected by a final
determination of the Commission . . . may appeal such determination,
within 60 days after the determination becomes final, to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.” The Federal Circuit
42
reviews legal determinations of the ITC de novo. This means the court
reviews the legal conclusion without deference, while “review[ing] the
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Kumar, supra note 6, at 538 (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (d)(1)).
39. Id. (citing Fuji Photo Film Co. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 386 F.3d 1095, 1107
(Fed. Cir. 2007); 19 U.S.C. § 1337(f)(1)).
40. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(f)(1) (2009).
41. Kumar, supra note 6, at 538 (citing Fuji Photo Film Co. 386 F.3d 1095, 1107 (Fed.
Cir. 2007)).
42. Checkpoint Sys., Inc., v. ITC, 54 F.3d 756, 760 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).

SHELBOURNE - FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE)

492

MARQUETTE I.P. LAW REVIEW

6/20/2011 1:12 PM

[Vol. 15:2

factual findings of the Commission under the substantial evidence
43
However, the Federal Circuit must give ITC some
standard.”
deference in certain situations. The Federal Circuit has held that the
ITC is entitled to a certain amount of deference to the extent that it is
44
interpreting its own statute that it is administering.
II. PATENT MISUSE IN SECTION 337 APPEALS
This Section of the Comment examines case law regarding the
patent misuse defense within § 337 appeals. The Federal Circuit’s most
45
recent and settled case on this topic, U.S. Phillips v. ITC, will be used
to facilitate the discussion as to what the present patent misuse
doctrines are within the context of § 337 appeals. Part A will lay out the
basic framework of the patent misuse doctrine. The basic framework
will be followed by a discussion of the two types of patent misuse. Per
se patent misuse will be explained in Part B, followed by patent misuse
under the rule of reason in Part C.
A. Patent Misuse
46

“Patent misuse is an equitable defense to patent infringement.” In
U.S. Phillips, Princo Corporation and Princo America (hereinafter
referred to as Princo collectively), the respondents, asserted the patent
misuse defense against U.S. Phillips, asserting that they could not be
liable for importing products that infringed several of U.S. Phillips’
patents because the patents were being used in an anticompetitive
47
manner.

43. Bourdeau Bros., Inc. v. ITC, 444 F.3d 1317, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
44. See Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. ITC, 545 F.3d 1340, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2008). There,
the court stated the following:
This court conducts statutory interpretations in accordance with the framework established
by Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Under
Chevron, “a reviewing court must first ask ‘whether Congress has directly spoken to the
precise question at issue.’” FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132
(2000) (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., 467 U.S. at 842). “If Congress has done so, the inquiry is at
an end; the court ‘must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.’”
However, if “the statute in question is ambiguous and the agency’s interpretation is
reasonable,” “a court must defer to an agency's construction of a statute governing agency
conduct.” Cathedral Candle Co. v. ITC, 400 F.3d 1352, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
45. 424 F.3d 1179 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
46. Id. at 1184.
47. See id. at 1183–84.
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The purpose of the patent misuse defense “[is to]
prevent a patentee from using the patent to obtain
market benefit beyond that which inheres in the
48
statutory patent right.”
As the Supreme Court has
explained, the doctrine of patent misuse bars a patentee
from using the ‘patent’s leverage’ to “extend the
monopoly of his patent to derive a benefit not
attributable to the use of the patent’s teachings,” such as
requiring a licensee to pay a royalty on products that do
49
not use the teaching of the patent. The “key inquiry is
whether, by imposing conditions that derive their force
from the patent, the patentee has impermissibly
broadened the scope of the patent grant with
50
anticompetitive effect.”
In U.S. Phillips, “Phillips own[ed] patents to technology for
manufacturing recordable compact discs (CD-Rs) and rewritable
compact discs (CD-RWs) that it licensed only through package
51
licenses.” There were several options as to the group of patents one
could license; within the licensing options were groupings that were
essential and nonessential to producing compact disc compliant with
52
certain technical standards.
Princo asserted that this practice
amounted to patent misuse because:
Phillips [was] improperly forc[ing] them, as a
condition of licensing patents that were necessary to
manufacture CD-Rs or CD-RWs, to take licenses to
other patents that were not necessary to manufacture
those products. In particular Princo argued that a
number of the patents included in the category of
‘essential’ patents were actually not essential for
53
manufacturing compact discs.
48. Id. at 1184 (citing Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 704 (Fed. Cir.
1992)).
49. U.S. Phillips Corp. v. I.T.C., 424 F.3d 1179, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing Zenith
Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Res., Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 135–36 (1969)).
50. Id. at 1184–85 (citing C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1372 (Fed.
Cir. 1998)); Windsurfing Int’l, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
51. Id. at 1182.
52. See id. at 1182.
53. U.S. Phillips Corp. v. ITC, 424 F.3d 1179, 1183 (Fed. Cir. 2005).

SHELBOURNE - FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE)

494

MARQUETTE I.P. LAW REVIEW

6/20/2011 1:12 PM

[Vol. 15:2

The ALJ, at the ITC, concluded that Princo had infringed various
claims of Phillips’ patents covering the CD-R and CD-RW
54
technologies. However, the ALJ also found that Phillips’ “patents
55
were unenforceable by reason of patent misuse”; more specifically the
judge held that “the package licensing arrangements constituted tying
arrangements that were illegal under analogous antitrust law principles
56
and thus rendered the subject patents unenforceable.”
Phillips
petitioned the ITC for review, and “[t]he Commission ruled that
Phillips’s patent packaging licensing arrangement constituted per se
patent misuse because Phillips did not give prospective licensees the
option of licensing individual patents . . . rather than licensing one or
57
more of the patent packages as a whole.” In the alternative, “the
Commission [held] that even if Phillips’s patent package licensing
practice was not per se patent misuse, it constituted patent misuse under
58
the rule of reason.” The Commission reasoned “the anticompetitive
effects of including nonessential patents in the packages of so-called
essential patents outweighed the procompetitive effects of that
59
practice.”
In reversing the ITC, the Federal Circuit proceeded through the per
se and rule of reason patent misuse doctrines, explaining why Phillips’
patent packaging practice did not amount to either form of patent
misuse.
B. Per Se Patent Misuse
A certain specific act must be committed in order to come under the
60
per se patent misuse doctrine.
[P]ractices . . . identified as constituting per se patent
misuse, ‘include[] . . . ‘tying’ arrangements in which a
patentee conditions a license under the patent on the
purchase of a separable, staple good, and arrangements
in which a patentee effectively extends the term of its
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1184.
58. U.S. Phillips Corp. v. ITC, 424 F.3d 1179, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1185 (“The court noted that certain specific practices have been identified as
constituting per se patent misuse . . . .”)
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patent by requiring post-expiration royalties.

“In 35 U.S.C. § 271(d), Congress designated several specific
practices that do not constitute patent misuse. [These] include
“condition[ing] the license of any rights to the patent or the sale of the
patented product on the acquisition of a license to rights in another
62
patent or purchase of a separate product.” However, these practices
become patent misuse if “the patent owner ‘has market power for the
patent or patented product on which the license or sale is
63
conditioned.’”
The Federal Circuit gives this provision a narrow
reading, finding it to “exclude[] such conditional licenses in which the
patent owner lacks market power from the category of arrangements
64
that may be found to constitute patent misuse.”
“If [a] particular
licensing arrangement . . . [does not fit within] one of those specific
[enumerated] practices, . . . it will be analyzed under the rule of
65
reason.”
In Phillips, the court held that Phillips had market power in the
66
relevant market; and therefore, it could not find refuge in § 271(d)(5).
Despite this, the Federal Circuit ultimately held that Phillips’ patent
67
packaging practice did not meet the threshold of per se patent misuse.
The court reasoned that Phillips’ practice differed vastly from a tying
arrangement, where the “patent owner uses the market power conferred
by the patent to compel customers to purchase a product in a separate
68
market . . . .” In Phillips, the situation differed because “a package
licensing agreement that includes both essential and nonessential
patents does not impose any requirement on the licensee;” the customer
69
is not compelled to use the patentee’s technology. Also, the court
found that the inclusion of nonessential patents within a licensing
70
package could not be inferred to increase the price of the package. “A
patent that is nonessential because it covers technology that can be fully

61. Id. at 1185 (citing Virginia Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860, 868–69
(Fed. Cir. 1997).
62. U.S. Phillips Corp. v. ITC, 424 F.3d. 1179, 1186 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
63. Id. at 1186 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5)).
64. See id.
65. Id. at 1185.
66. U.S. Phillips Corp. v. ITC, 424 F.3d 1179, 1186 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
67. Id. at 1197.
68. See id. at 1189 (citing United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 400 (1948)).
69. Id. at 1190.
70. Id. at 1191.
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replaced by alternative technology that is available for free is essentially
71
valueless;” thus, their inclusion cannot reasonably have an impact on
the overall package cost and presumably do not create an incentive to
buy the essential patents separately.
Finding that Phillips’ conduct could not be conclusively presumed to
be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry, the
court turned to rule of reason analysis.
C. Patent Misuse Under the Rule of Reason
[Under the rule of reason,] “the finder of fact must
decide whether the questioned practice imposes an
unreasonable restraint on competition, taking into
account a variety of factors, including specific
information about the relevant business, its condition
before and after the restraint was imposed, and the
72
restraint’s history, nature and effect.”
To charge a patentee with patent misuse, the practice at issue must
be within the patent grant and must broaden the scope of the patent,
73
“either in terms of covered subject matter or temporality.” There must
also be a finding that the potential anticompetitive effects outweigh the
74
potential procompetitive effects of the behavior.
In Phillips, the court held that Phillips’ patent packaging practice did
75
not constitute patent misuse under the rule of reason.
The court
reasoned that offering the nonessential patents did not amount to an
anticompetitive effect; the patent packages did not have a negative
76
impact on commercially available technology, and did not “[force]
customers to purchase a product in a separate market that the customer
77
might otherwise purchase from a competitor.” Rather, the court found
that package licensing has procompetitive effects in that it “provides the
parties a way of ensuring that a single licensing fee will cover all the
78
patents needed to practice a particular technology.”
The Federal
71.
72.
(1997)).
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

U.S. Phillips Corp. v. ITC, 424 F.3d 1179, 1191 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Id. at 1197 (citing Virginia Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860, 869
Id. (citing Virginia Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860, 869 (1997)).
See id. at 1198.
See id.
See U.S. Philips Corp. v. ITC, 424 F.3d 1179, 1198 (Fed Cir. 2005).
Id. at 1189 (citing United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 400 (1948)).
Id. at 1193.
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Circuit further found that “grouping licenses in a package allows the
parties to price the package based on their estimate of what it is worth
to practice a particular technology, which is typically much easier to
calculate than determining the marginal benefit provided by a license to
79
each individual patent.” “In short, [the court found] package licensing
[to have many] procompetitive effect[s] [associated with] reducing the
80
degree of uncertainty involved with investment decisions.”
III. PRESCRIPTIVE MODEL: PATENT MISUSE UNDER THE RULE OF
REASON ANALYSIS CAN KEEP A BETTER BALANCE OF ANTITRUST
AND PATENT POLICY WITH A MIXED TEST
The Federal Circuit’s decision in Phillips is well reasoned and lays
out the doctrinal framework of patent misuse under § 337 quite well.
Analysis of the patent misuse framework set out in that decision brings
to light several issues regarding antitrust law and how it is fairing at the
Federal Circuit in § 337 appeals. This Section of the Comment lays out
those issues, particularly those that arise with the rule of reason analysis
of patent misuse, and poses a potential solution. Part A of this Section
will discuss why the rule of reason analysis and not the per se doctrine of
patent misuse causes concerns for both antitrust and patent policy
within the context of § 337. The primary issue is that the current
analysis applies antitrust to patent law, which could cause the court to
overlook patent and antitrust violations. Part B posits that this problem
could be resolved by using a mixed test that will promote the court to
consider antitrust and patent violations separately.
A. The Problem with the Rule of Reason Analysis
Section 337 is very much a mixed statute in that it promotes both
patent and antitrust policies. The doctrine foremost seeks to protect the
monopoly of domestic patents by preventing the importation of goods
81
that infringe upon them. The statute also promotes fair competition
within the domestic market by eliminating unfair acts of international
82
competition.
Lastly, the application of the patent misuse doctrine
within § 337 promotes the proper use of patents by taking away the right
83
to prevent the importation of infringing products.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id.
See id.
See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B)(i) (2009).
See generally 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2009).
See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(f)–(i)) (1994).
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A proper patent misuse analysis, then, should take into account both
the patent and antitrust aspects of § 337. This goal is achieved with the
per se patent misuse doctrine. There, Congress has already considered
the patent and antitrust justifications and decided what specific
84
circumstances the doctrine applies to. However, the current function
of the rule of reason patent misuse doctrine does not require the court
to specifically address the patent and antitrust issues at hand.
“[T]he rule of reason [analysis] focuses on one particular issue: the
impact on competition, rather than all possible equitable
85
considerations.” The test solely looks to whether the anticompetitive
86
effects are outweighed by procompetitive benefits. Within the context
of § 337, the doctrine applies antitrust law to patent law to discover
whether a patent is in violation of antitrust law. This can be detrimental
for merited patent misuse claims because these elements are extremely
87
difficult to meet, and as a result, a court may not find misuse in an
action that is indeed unjustifiably anticompetitive. Also, the application
of antitrust to patent law is a difficult fit because of the contentious
88
relationship between patent and antitrust law.
B. Resolving the Rule of Reason Problem with a Mixed Analysis
It is imperative that neither a valid antitrust or patent law claim be
missed in a patent misuse case. Patent misuse claims brought under §
337 mandate this even more so because the statute functions on both
antitrust and patent justifications; missing a policy issue on either side
could lead to the wrong result in a case. A mixed test for the rule of
reason could ensure that antitrust and patent issues are both being
considered in a patent misuse analysis.
Under a mixed analysis, a patent misuse claim is examined
separately for patent and antitrust violations and then weighed for
89
procompetitive and anticompetitive effects. The separate steps ensure
90
that a court has addressed both issues in arriving at its decision. A
similar test has been proposed for general analysis of the patent misuse
84.
85.

See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2009).
Robin C. Feldman, The Insufficiency of Antitrust Analysis for Patent Misuse, 55
HASTINGS L.J. 399, 422 (2003–2004).
86. Id. (citing PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶
100a 345–46).
87. See id.
88. See generally id.
89. See id. generally at 428–29.
90. See generally Feldman, supra note 85, at 428–29.
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91

doctrine under the rule of reason. Adopting a mixed test for § 337
patent misuse claims is even more so justified because of the abundance
of patent and antitrust policies the statute seeks to promote.
Furthermore, within the context of appeals of ITC decisions on patent
misuse claims to the Federal Circuit, a mixed analysis will assist the
court in allotting the correct amount of deference to the ITC’s decisions
under § 337. As its authorizing statute, § 337 empowers the ITC to
make patent and antitrust determinations for which they should be
92
accorded Chevron deference.
CONCLUSION
To answer the question posed earlier, examination of § 337 patent
misuse appeals to the Federal Circuit shows that antitrust claims are
being grouped with patent law and, at least in Phillips, losing. A case
involving the same players and the same technology, Princo Corp. v.
ITC, was vacated on April 20, 2009 and remanded for a rehearing en
banc because the Commission had not addressed all the grounds on
93
which the ALJ had based his ruling. In Princo Corp., Princo asserted
patent misuse as a defense to Phillips’s accusations of patent
94
infringement.
95
As in Phillips, Princo’s argument failed. There, the Commission
held that the doctrine of patent misuse did not bar Phillips from
96
enforcing its patent rights against Princo.
Here, the Commission
reasoned that even if Phillip’s blanket licensing agreement constituted a
pooling arrangement, Princo failed to show that the pool of licensors
would have competed in the technology absent the pooling
97
arrangement.
Also, the Commission found no showing of
anticompetitive effect as required by the patent misuse rule of reason
98
The Commission did not consider per se patent misuse
analysis.
because Princo’s claim did not pertain to an act which would trigger the
99
per se doctrine.
91. Id. at 429.
92. See supra note 45.
93. Princo Corp. v. ITC, 563 F.3d 1301, 1301, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
94. Id. at 1305.
95. U.S. Phillips Corp. v. ITC, 424 F.3d 1179 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
96. See id.
97. See Princo Corp., at 1314–15.
98. See id. at 1308–09.
99. Behaviors that trigger the per se patent misuse doctrine include: 1) tying
arrangements in which a patentee conditions a license under the patent on the purchase of a
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En banc, the Federal Circuit affirmed the ITC’s decision, finding
100
that Phillips’s behavior did not give rise to patent misuse. There, the
majority refused to extend the patent misuse doctrine to accommodate
101
the argument made by Princo.
The majority supported its opinion
102
USM states that patent misuse
with USM Corp. v. SPS Techs., Inc.
should be reserved to circumstances where the patentee attempts to
103
extend his patent grant beyond its statutory limits. The majority also
suggested that antitrust law adequately addresses patent misuse
104
claims.
Princo Corp. truly exhibits the spectrum of opinions on the patent
misuse doctrine. The concurring judges splintered because of their
disagreement with “the majority’s apparent view that antitrust
considerations are an entirely ‘different issue,’ separate and apart from
105
the question of whether there has been patent misuse.” Instead, the
judges found that the lines of the patent misuse doctrine should be
drawn less narrowly than the majority suggested and less expansively
106
than the dissent suggested.
In opposition to the majority and the
concurrence, the dissenting judges argued that the majority’s standard
was too strict “and allow[ed] patent holders free rein to prevent the
development of potentially competitive technologies except in the most
107
extreme and unlikely circumstances.”
In regards to the rule of reason patent misuse doctrine, Princo
108
exemplifies many of the same issues presented by Phillips. Both cases
bring to light the blurriness of the rule of reason analysis and
substantiate the argument for including a mixed test, which will ensure
both patent and antitrust justifications are weighed. It will be
interesting to see how this area of the law develops, especially in a case
separable, staple good, and arrangements in which a patentee effectively extends the term of
its patent by requiring post-expiration royalties; and 2) other behaviors in which the patent
holder uses the market power conferred by the patent to compel customers to purchase a
product in a separate market. U.S. Phillips Corp. v. ITC, 424 F.3d 1179, 1185 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(citing Virginia Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860, 868–69 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
100. Princo Corp. v. ITC, 616 F.3d 1318,1321–22, (Fed. Cir. 2010).
101. See id. at 1329.
102. 694 F.2d 505, 510 (7th Cir. 1982). (There, the court stated that patent misuse “has
largely been confined to a handful of specific practices by which the patentee seemed to be
trying to ‘extend’ his patent grant beyond its statutory limits.”).
103. See id.
104. See Princo Corp. v. ITC, 616 F.3d 1318, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
105. See id. at 1340 (Prost, J., concurring) (citing majority opinion at 1332).
106. See id. at 1340–41 (Prost, J. concurring).
107. See id. at 1357 (Dyk, J. dissenting).
108. See U.S. Phillips Corp. v. ITC, 424 F.3d 1179 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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with new players.
Through the guide of the Federal Circuit’s Phillips decision, this
Comment sought to reveal that the mixed nature of § 337, grounded in
both patent and antitrust justifications, is only further complicated by
the patent misuse doctrine; therefore, requiring that both patent and
antitrust policies be considered to ensure results that are consistent with
§ 337’s aims and goals. While the current per se patent misuse doctrine
meets the burden of addressing both patent and antitrust justifications,
it is not clear that the rule of reason doctrine does. This goal would be
better served under the rule of reason doctrine if a mixed analysis were
used before the weighing of procompetitive and anticompetitive effects.
A mixed test will ensure that both antitrust and patent justifications are
considered in resolving patent misuse claims. This is essential for patent
misuse generally and, even more so, within the context of § 337 and §
337 appeals to the Federal Circuit.
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